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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
SEYMOUR THOMPSON and WENDELL
L. THOMPSON, Co-Administrators of the
Estate of Glenn Wendell Thompson, also
known as Wen dell Thompson, deceased,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.
ANDREW H. GRIFFITHS and wife,
ADELINE GRIFFITHS,
Defendants and .Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
This is an appeal by defendants Andrew H. Griffiths
and wife, Adeline Griffiths, frmn a judgment dated
September 22, 1958, in favor of plaintiffs quieting their
title to a certain dry fann located sorne distance north
and east of Clarkston, Cache County, Utah. Plaintiffs'
complaint was in the usual fonn. Defendant Adeline
Griffiths filed a separate answer in the nature of a disclailner in which she avered that she had no interest in
the pre1nises except only as the wife of Andrew H.
Griffiths. Andrew H. Griffiths filed an answer in which
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he claims a prescriptive right to travel across plaintiffs'
premises along an established roadway, which road left
his premises adjoining plaintiffs' premises on the east,
crossed plaintiffs' premises in a general southwesterly
direction to the southwest corner thereof, and entered
a count~r highway extending in a north and south direction along the west side of plaintiffs' premises. The
trial was to the Court sitting without a jury. The Court
entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Decree in favor of plaintiffs and against both defendants decreeing that defendants had no prescriptive right
to travel said roadway and assessed costs against both
defendants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Andrew H. Griffiths is the owner of 160 acres of
land situate near the top of a mountainous area about 6
miles north and east from the town of Clarkston, the
residence of plaintiffs and defendants. The crest of
this mountain terrain extends in a northerly and southerly direction across defendants' land in such a manner
as to cut his farm into two tracts.
All of the tillable land in this tract is and, during
all times mentioned in the evidnece, has been what is
known as a dry farm upon which defendant has grown
dry land grain and some alfalfa.
Because of the precipitous terrain near the summit
it is impossible to transport grain, hay and farm machinery from one tract to the other. The portion of the
farm west of the summit consisting of about 100 acres
slopes sharply to the west toward Clarkston which is
2
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situate in the lower valley.
sisting of about 26 acres of
the crest or summit slopes
located in the lower area of

The easterly portion contillable land to the east 0f
to the east towards towns
Cache Valley.

Defendant reached this easterly tract by traveling
on what is known as the Rabsten Rmid but because of
the nature of the terrain he cannot cross over to the
western 100 acre- tract with loads of grain_ or hay or
heavy farm machinery. rr1 he only access to this tract
is to travel the county highway northward to the _southwest corner of plaintiffs' land, then enter the plaintiffs'
preinises at the southwest corner and follow the road
in question across plaintiffs' premises and then enter
his pren1ises at a point approxi1nately 22 rods South
of the Northeast corner of the Southeast Quarter of the
Northwest Quarter of Section 18. (See defendants'
Exhibit 4, an aerial map taken by the r. S. Soil Conservation Office on August 7, 1946, which Exhibit shows
the location of the Griffiths' property. The high mountain crest is the dark area crossing- the same.
The
Thompson property to the west and the white line appearing thereon is the roadway in question. - See also
Exhibit 2 being a sin1ilar aerial photograph taken October 9, 1937, and Exhibit 3 taken October :2~, 1953.) In
all these exhibits the ·white line 1narking the roadway in
question appears thereon.
DEFENDANTS' EVIDENCE
We shall briefly sunnnarize defendants' evidence
with respect to the nature of this roadway and the use
to which it was applied hy defendant, his sons, agent's
and ernployees.

3
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JESSE BUTTARS testified that he acquired the
defendants' property in 1920, that he farmed the same
until 1929 when he sold it to defendant, Andrew H.
Griffiths (TR 69), that he went over the road a few
days before the trial and it was then in substantially
the same place and condition as when he traveled the
road. That there were only two slight variations in the
road made while he traveled thereon. One slight change
was made when Wendell Thompson, the deceased, dug
a well near his old home near the south line of his property and a short distance to the east of his west line;
that Thompson asked him to go a little further around
the well which he did and then came right back into
the road (TR 85); that this slight change was made because Thompson wanted it changed (TR 86); that he
talked to Thompson only once about the road. He,
Thompson, wanted to change the road along the
Anderson fence to the south. Buttars told him he would
consent if he, Thompson, would make that road as good
as the present one. Thompson then went up and put in
a day on the proposed new road. Then he said,
''If I worked to the morning of the first
resurrection I would never have that road as good
as this, so you go where you were."
He further testified that you couldn't go by way of the
Rabsten unless you just took a team of horses and went
up there ( r:rR 88-89). Buttars described the use he made
of the road from 1920 to 1929 each and every year
(TR 74-75).
Defendant, ANDREW H. GRIFFFrHS, testified
he purchased this property from Jesse Buttars and ob-

4
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tained his deed on September 4, 1929. (See Exhibit 1,
abstract entries No. 39 and 40). When he acquired this
property the road was there and he understood that he
had the right to travel this road; that the road followed
substantially the white line shown on Exhibits 2, 3, and
4 (TR 18); that he .traveled this road each and every
year since 1929 for all purposes incident to going from
his home in Clarkston up to the fann, transporting
necessary farn1 machinery and hauling his crops pro,.
duced upon the· 1.00 acr,e tract back to Clarkston; that
he has claimed the right to use the road at .all times;
that about 3 years ago, and after the death of Wendell
Thompson and after his boys took over the operation,
was the first time he ever heard of any objection (TR
19-20). About 15 years ago ( 1942) a flood cut ·out the
road in one place so he moved out a little; that he
talked to Thompson about n1aking this slight change;
that Thon1pson said it was alright to n1ake the change,
however, that he continue to travel along the old road
when going down hill with a load of grain, the width of
this change was about 50 feet wide and 300 feet long
(TR 65-66).
WELDON GRIFFI':I:'HS, son, age 35, was 7 years
old when his father acquired this farn1 ( TR 61). He
ren1ained on the fann until 1942. On cross examination
he stated that they did not have any trouble while
Wen dell Th01upson \nls alive ( TR 111).
ACIL GRIFFI':I:'HS, son, age 31, worked on the
farm until fall of 1944. Then fr01n 1946 to 1952 worked
off and on. 'l1 hat they alway8 traveled this road for
all purposes incident to the operation of their farm

5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

without any objection ,(TR 120).
JOHN GRIFFITHS, brother of the defendant, was
in the property when Jesse Buttars owned it, has been
over it recently. The road is in practically the same
location now as it was then (TR 135).
DE .MAR GRIFFITHS, son, age 29, worked on
farm until 1948 then left for a mission. He has operated
the farm continously since 1953. (TR 140). About 3
years ago was the first time he ever knew of anyone
objecting to our traveling on the road (TR 144).
MURLE GODFREY hauled grain from the Griffiths
farm between 15 and 20 years ago. Hauled it over this
road. Road in substantially same position now as when
he hauled the grain over it. Thompson never n1ade any
objection to his traveling over the road ( TR 155).
We shall reserve for later discussion the evidence
offered by plaintiffs and their witnesses.
STArrEMENT OF POINTS
1. The Court erred in entering judgment against
defendant, Adeline Griffiths, and in assessing costs
against her.
2. The Court erred in making that part of Finding No. 3 as follows:
"The defendants, their agents and employees,
crossed over and traveled over the above described lands with the consent of the said Wendell
Thompson, deceased, and the defendants, their
agents and employees travelled over said land on
a route and way that the Wendell Thompson,
6
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deceased,
travel."

indicated over

which they

should

for the reason that said Finding is not supported by any
credible evidence.
3. The Court erred in making that part of Finding
No. 4 as follows :
"So that every 2 years all of said lands were
planted and the crops harvested and the plowing
and harvests were made on and over the trails
and ways traveled prior thereto."
for the reason that said Finding is not supported by any
credible evidence.
4. The Court erred in n1aking Finding No. 5 and
the whole thereof for the reason that said Finding is not
supported by any credible evidence.

5. The Court erred in making Finding No. 7 and
the whole thereof for the reason that said Finding is
not supported by any credible evidence.

The Court erred in 1naking Conclusions of Law
Nos. 1, 3, and 4 and in entering a Decree in favor of
plaintiffs and against defendants for the reason that
said decree is contrary to all the credible evidence in
this case and is against law.
6.

ARGUlvlENT
POINT 1. rrhe Court erred in entering judgment
against defendant, Adeline Griffiths, and in assessing
costs against her.
rritle to the property is vested in the na1ne of Andrew
7
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H . Griffiths. rrhe abstract, Exhibit "1," shows that
Adeline Griffiths never has had any vested title in this
property. She filed an answer in which she disclaimed
any interest in the property except only her statutory
dower rights. There is no evidence that she ever
travelled this road or that she ever claimed any right
to do so. There is no evidence that she ever trespassed
upon plaintiffs' property. How then, could the Court
'enter judgment against her, enjoining her frmn trespassing· when she had never done . so nor claimed any
right to do so. The Courf also entered judgment for
eo,sts against her. This, we think, was clearly erroneous.
POINTS 2 TO 6, INCLUSIVE. We think that
Points 2 to 6 can all be discussed together.
Appellants rely upon the case of Zollinger v. Frank,
110 Utah 514, 175 P. 2d 714, as controlling in this case,
wherein this court holds
"Adverse use of away, to create a prescriptive right of way, must be against the owner as
distinguished from under the owner regardless
of whether use is. described as peaceable, hostile,
adverse to or acquiesced in hy servient owner."
and the case further holds
"Where a claimant to a right-of-way has
shown an open and continuous use of land for the
prescriptive period of 20 years the use will he
presumed to have been against the owner. An
owner of servient estate, to prevent the pre~crip
tive easement of use has the burden of showing
that use was under him instead of against him."
Our reason for summarizing the defendant's evidence is
to show that the defendant, Andrew Griffiths, proved
8
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a continuous use of the roadway for more .than 20 years
and, therefore, a presu1nption arises that such use was
against the owner and the burden of proof was upon the
plaintiffs to prove that the use was under the owner
rather than against the owner.
The evidence shows without dispute that Jesse
Buttars acquired the Griffiths' property in 1920, that he
farmed this land continuously each and every year and
used the road continuously for all uses incident to his
farming operation until September, 1929, when he sold
the property to defendant, Andrew H. Griffiths. That
his use was open, continuous and against the owner
Wendell Thompson, deceased, cannot be doubted.
Thompson recognized his right ·when he requested
Buttars to n1ake a slight change around the well and
also when he tried to change the road near the Anderson
property but found it to expensive and he told Buttars
to continue to use the road as it then existed. We contend, therefore, that the necessary elements requisite to
acquiring a prescriptive right was proved from 1920 to
the fall of 1929. Griffiths acquired the property in
1929. The road was there at that ti1ne and he understood
and and believed he had the right to travel this road so
he continued the san1e use previously n1ade by Buttars.
When, therefore, would his use ripen into a prescriptive
right o? We say in the year 1940. So if the evidence
shows a use by Griffiths against the owner Thompson
until the year 1940, then such use would ripen into a
prescriptive right and any subsequent use from 1940
until the date of trial would not destroy the prescriptive
right already aequired even though there was some

9
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.slight changes in the ro<:J.,d travelled after 1940.
The Court found (Finding 3) that there existed a
close, friendly and intimate relationship between
Thompson ,and Griffiths. This may be true, but we
don't understand the law to be that a feeling of enmity
or ill ·will is necessary to acquiring a prescriptive right.
Then the Court finds that defendants, their agents,
etc., crossed and travelled ov.er this road with the consent of Thompson and on a road that Thompson indicated
over which they should travel.
We contend there is no credible-_ evidence in this
record that can sustain this finding or that .between the
years 1920 to 1940 the road was travelled with the consent
of Wendell Thompson as that term is defined by this
court in the Zollinger case, supra. Of course, Thompson
kne\v t_hey wei·e using this road but he made no objection
to this use. He recognized their right to travel thereon.
In analyzing this testimony these facts should be
considered :
A. This roadway was the only way that the
owners _of the Griffiths land could gain access
to the West 100 acres of the farm. It i~ admitted that they farmed this land every year
since 1920. There is no other road by which
they could gain access to this property. No
one contends that there was any road leading
frorn the East 26 acre tract over the precipitous mountain terrain. If tlwy crossed by
this method, as vaguely suggested, there would
certainly be evidence of a road or trail over
and across this area which- was not farmed.
B. That this was the onl~- road travelled hy d(~
fendant, Andrew H. Griffiths, and Buttars is
10
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born out by the 3 aerial maps taken by the
U. S. Conservation Bureau. The first one
(Exhibit "2") was taken October 9, 1937, just
3 years before the ripening of the prescriptive
right. It shows by a white continuous line the
roadway as it leaves the Griffiths property at
the jog in his fence line and entered the county
road at the Southwest corner of the Thompso~
property. The next photograph (Exhibit "4")
was taken August 7, 1946, 6 years after the
vesting of the prescriptive right. It shows
the road in the same identical location. rrhe
third photo (Exhibit "3") taken August 29,
1953, or 13 years after the ripening of the
prescriptive right, is not as distinct as Exhibits "2" and "4", but the roadway can be seen
along the same course. These photographs
cannot be disputed. If there was a road, as
shown by these photographs, then the only
person who used the road from the old house
to the denfendant's premises was the use made
by defendant Griffiths and Buttars and their
agents and servants.
Plaintiffs' evidence does show that they used the
road jointly with Griffiths and Buttars from its entry
into their farm to the old house and corrals located a
short distance to the East, but there is no evidence of
any use by plaintiffs fr01n that point Northeasterly to
the defendant's fanu. In fact their contention was that
no roadway existed beyond this point, but the court
found otherwise because the court does find that the
defendant used the road but the court concludes that
the use ·was under Th01npson and not against him. A
conclusion whieh cannot be supported by the evidence.
~rhe

Zollinger ease, supra, also holds

11
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'"Where reeord did not support clai1n that
defendant opened road over defendant's land for
defendant's own use and that defendant used
road only infrequently and then only a portion of
it and that plaintiff used road for· entire length
thereof at such time as he desired during prescriptive period, evidence failed to raise presumption that use by plaintiff was permissable and
failed to rebut presumption that use was against
defendant."
rrhe court also finds in Finding No. 4,
''That each year they plowed approximately
one-half of the land so that every 2 years all of
the land was plowed except such land as was in
alfalfa and every year approxin1ately one-half
of said lands were seeded, cultivated and crops
grown thereon which wereharvested so that every
2 years all of said lands were planted and the
crops harvested and the plowing and harvest were
made on and over the trails and ways prior
thereto."
It seems difficult to rationalize this finding with the
evidence. The aerial map shows a well defined road
along the same course in 19371946 and 1953. It is true
that in certain places at certain times plaintl.ffs, while
plowing and planting, would cross portions of the roadway because it was easier to do this than to farm the
separate tracts divided by the road, but the road was
not destroyed and defendant continued to travel. the
same. However, most of this occurred during the last
few years and since the death of Wendell Thompson
which occurred r..; ovemher 19, 1947, or 7 years after the
20 year period.
The Court found (No. 7) that the plaintiffs have

12
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for many years, as a neighborly accomodation, permitted
the defendant to travel across plaintiffs'- premises but
that during the last 3 or 4 years and especially since the
death of Wen dell Thompson, trouble has developed between the parties with the plaintiffs atteinpting to more
carefully plow up old trails and so-called roadways
which defendant has used. In other words, the Court
recognized from this finding that the so-called interference was asserted after 1949 and not before. If we
are correct in this contention then what n1ay have happened since 1940 would be immaterial under the doctrine
announced by this Court in the case of Dahnken Y. George
Romney and Sons Company, 111 Utah 471, 184 P. 2d 214,
wherein this court at page 216, syl. 9, says
"By assuming Romney has the right to cross
area "C" both defendants, by their adverse use
of segment "B" for the prescriptive period acquired prescriptive easements therein, not mere
ways of necessity which 1night ten11inate when
the necessity no longer existed. That another
road for travel became available to the dominant
owners does not of itself destroy or admit to an
abandonment of their prescriptive easements."
See also C. J. S., paragraph 13, page 650.
We contend that Finding X o. 5 is not supported by
any credible evidence but that on the contrary all credible
evidence shows that at least frmn 1920 to 1940 there was
an adverse, hostile use of the roadway as that term has
been defined. The plaintiff Thmnpson's evidence which
sought to show interference was so vague both as to
tiine and eharacter as to not be worthy of credence. For
instance, see h~stimony of Seynwur Thompson who adInitted that when Griffiths hauled out his grain he mostly
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followed the hollow right against the fence and then at
TR 216 he finally stated
"rrhere was no trouble until DeMor rented
the place and this has been for the last 2 or 3
years."
l\Iyron Thompson, a son, stated that he knew of no
other way Griffiths .could travel from the West side except through "our" property and then he said there
was no road in September of 1946. We invite the court's
attention again to the aerial photograph which was taken
on September 7, 1946 and which shows conclusively that
there was a well defined road in existence at that time.
Myron Thompson on rebuttal stated that in the latter
part of August or the first part of September, 1946, he
overheard a conversation between his father and
Griffiths. It is to be noted that this wa~ 6 years after
the prescriptive period. However, after l\iyron Thompson
had definitely fixed the time of this conversation as
during the latter part of August, 1946, defendants then
proved conclusively that Andrew H. Griffiths was confined to the hospital in Logan for a broken leg which
occurred about the middle of August and that he never
left his home until several rnonths thereafter so that he
couldn't possibly have had any conversation at the time
and place indicated.
We call these matters to the court's attention for the
reason, as we contend, the evidence of the plaintiffs in
many respects was vague, inconclusive and some of it
not worthy of belief and we think it falls short of overcoming the presumption heretofore referred to as announced in the Zollinger case.

14
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If we are correct in our analysis of the findings,
then it must follow that the conclusions of law and the
decree cannot find support in the evidence and that they
are against the law. We contend the judgment of the
trial court should be reversed and findlngs entered in
favor of defendant Andrew H. Griffiths establishing
his prescriptive right to travel the roadway in question.
Respectfully submitted,
LeRoy B. Young, of
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN
Attorneys for Appellants
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